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#122
Islamic Duties / Re: Assimilation of Newly Converted Muslim Brothers
July 19, 2013, 06:36:48 AM
Salaam brother,
Here is a video of a sister sharing her emotions on the subject you shared with us
http://youtu.be/-k76SUOHPx8
24 minutes... maybe some can relate
How I almost left Islam
As Salaam Alaykum Sisters! Please forgive my amateur video, I did like no editing because I just don't know how AND I didn't have alot of time to figure it o...
BY AIMEE YACOUBA
Here is a video of a sister sharing her emotions on the subject you shared with us
http://youtu.be/-k76SUOHPx8
24 minutes... maybe some can relate
How I almost left Islam
As Salaam Alaykum Sisters! Please forgive my amateur video, I did like no editing because I just don't know how AND I didn't have alot of time to figure it o...
BY AIMEE YACOUBA
#123
Discussions / the-month-of-the-quran
July 14, 2013, 12:54:16 AM #124
Discussions / ramadan mubarak
July 09, 2013, 03:05:45 PM #125
Discussions / Re: ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
July 08, 2013, 02:52:20 AM
PART 2 OF 3
CONSTITUTIONALISM & ISLAM
The Clash of Higher Laws
===================
But this is the very issue upon which Western constitutionalism and Islamic constitutionalism encounter some nettlesome issues of reconcilability. Western constitutionalism posits the existence of a higher law grounded in human reason. Two factors were determinative in giving rise to the idea of constitutionalism: a robust notion of natural law, on the one hand, and a relatively weak idea of divine law in Christianity, on the other. The theoretical foundation of constitutionalism in the West is the natural law tradition of the ancient Greeks and Romans, particularly the Stoics. The natural law tradition flowed from the Romans into the works of the great philosophers of the Western Church, who found little by way of divine legislation in the life or teachings of Christ to challenge it. Enlightenment philosophers, particularly Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, shifted the emphasis in natural law thinking from duties to rights. In this framework, the constitution is the scripture of a civil religion, but because it originates in the mind of man, this scripture is assumed to be inherently and endlessly interpretable by human beings.
In contrast, the Islamic heritage bequeaths to modern constitution writers a relatively weak idea of natural law, on the one hand, and a robust notion of divine law, on the other. The higher law of the man-made constitution thus has the potential to clash with the higher law of God, the Sharia. And insofar as the Sharia is understood to contain specific and immutable legal rulings, as it is according to many influential theorists, this clash seriously limits the ability of Muslim reformers to revise the Sharia according to their understanding of what good government and human rights require.
This clash has ancient roots in the Islamic intellectual tradition. Perhaps from the time of the prophet Muhammad himself, the Quran was viewed in part as an expression of divine law. The Quranic text may not explicate a constitution for the Islamic state, but it does contain verses on a variety of subjects, ranging from marriage and inheritance to war and peace, that have legal import. Some injunctions are preceded by the words kutiba 'alaykum ("it is written for you"), suggesting that God is directly legislating for humanity.
As long as the Prophet lived among his people, there was no question as to the supreme interpretive agent for divine revelation. The problem that confronted the Muslim community immediately after Muhammad's death was how to interpret the Quran, particularly when verses are ambiguous or apparently contradictory, and what normative value, if any, to give the sunna, the sum total of Muhammad's prophethood in words and deeds. Ibn Khaldun notes in the Muqaddima that the four legal schools that had coalesced in Sunni Islam by the fourteenth century were characterized by the degree to which they championed reason over tradition. The Hanafis favored the use of opinion (ra'y) and analogy (qiyas), while the Malikis relied on traditions, especially the living tradition of the Medinan Muslims who were assumed to preserve most faithfully the sunna of the Prophet and his companions. The Shafi'is attempted to synthesize these two approaches, but their synthesis clearly favored the champions of tradition over opinion. The last school to emerge, the Hanbali, continued this trend toward reliance on the Quranic text and its interpretation through the hadiths of the Prophet. But, as Ibn Khaldun makes clear, the proponents of tradition did not disavow all interpretive activity (ijtihad) by qualified jurists because the jurist's task was to illuminate Sharia by his jurisprudence. He notes caustically that the literalists, or Zahiris, who shunned ijtihad, failed to establish a lasting school, and were only occasionally followed by "worthless people."[4]
The early controversies in jurisprudence were mirrored by bitter disputes in speculative theology (kalam). Mu'tazili theologians advocated ethical objectivism, that truth and falsehood, right and wrong, are objective categories, discernible by human reason and independent of God's will. Influenced by Aristotelian philosophy and possibly reacting to theological disputations with their Christian counterparts in Syria and Iraq, the Mu'tazilis were trying to reconcile Greco-Roman natural law arguments with Islamic conceptions of divine law.
The Mu'tazili faith in reason was vociferously challenged by other schools. The Maturidi school accepted reason as a source of moral knowledge, but held that the Mu'tazili position relied excessively on it over revelation. The Maturidi view was a middle ground of sorts between the Mu'tazilis and their fiercest critics, the Ash'aris. In opposition to the Mu'tazilis' embrace of ethical objectivism, the Ash'aris held that God's power could not be subject to any objective ethical values; rather, ethical value was derived entirely from God's command. Man discovers right action through God's grace to his creation, through the scriptures and the actions of divinely inspired prophets. These sources of divine law are the only arbiters of the moral content of specific actions. Without the light of the Sharia, humans cannot be sure that an action is good or bad.
By the end of the twelfth century, for reasons more political than intellectual, the Ash'ari position had emerged as dominant in Sunni Islam. Maturidism remained influential, particularly in areas ruled by Turkic dynasties in Anatolia and central and southern Asia. Mu'tazilism lingered in some Sunni circles, but its impact was greatest on the evolution of Shi'i jurisprudence, which underwent its own controversy between traditionalists and rationalists, ending in the eighteenth century with the triumph of the latter. In Sunni Islam the ascendancy of the Ash'ari position had profound consequences for the evolution of Islamic conceptions of law and ethics.
A moral epistemology rooted in revelation is intrinsically conservative. Those most familiar with revelation, the ulema (religious scholars), were placed in a privileged position to interpret the faith to the mass of the faithful. Confronted as they were with political instability and pressures to interpret the law in ways favorable to those in power, the ulema naturally tended toward greater conservatism in their legal interpretation. One could say they upheld the Sharia as a higher law above human tampering and expedient interpretations. But, in this Islamic context, the higher law that was being upheld was rooted in conceptions of divine, not natural law. The "closing of the gates of ijtihad" was an event more mythic than real—as legal interpretation certainly continued—but behind the myth lies an undeniable reality: the ethos that gripped Sunni legal scholarship was deeply resistant to change or critical inquiry. Ibn Khaldun has some pointed comments on this development: "(Scholars) came to profess their inability (to apply independent judgment), and had the people adopt the tradition of the (authorities) mentioned and of the respective group of adherents of each. . . . The person who would claim independent judgment nowadays would be frustrated and have no adherents."[5]
As development and even reinterpretation of the Sharia became more and more restricted, while Muslim societies continued to change and encounter new challenges, extra-Sharia legislation developed parallel with it. This siyasa shar'iyya or qanun created, in effect, an ever-increasing sphere of secular law. As the qanun expanded in scope, the Sharia contracted—in practice, not in theory. In theory, qanun was the realm of man-made laws, tolerated by ulema for pragmatic or utilitarian purposes but never as a substitute for the ideal divine law.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the ideology of constitutionalism began to creep into Islamic political thought as more and more Muslims visited and studied in Europe. The need to reopen the Sharia to reinterpretation and reform was one of the driving forces underlying the advocacy of constitutionalism among reformers. For these men, constitutionalism was the supreme manifestation of neo-ijtihad, a legitimate vehicle for the reconceptualization of Islamic polity and the creation of new and more effective political institutions that reflect the true purposes of an Islamic ethical system. But from the beginning, the reformers faced concerted opposition from many ulema and other conservatives, who viewed constitutionalism as the latest assault on the sacred law. According to this view of Islamic polity, the Quran and Prophetic sunna provide the immutable Islamic "constitution," and human engagement with these sources is limited to "law finding" rather than lawmaking. In his treatise Islamic Law and Constitution, Abu al-A'la Mawdudi declared: "It is beyond the purview of any legislature of an Islamic state to legislate in contravention of the directives of God and His Prophet, and all such pieces of legislation, even though approved by the legislature would ispo facto be considered ultra vires of the Constitution."[6] And Ayatollah Khomeini continued his statement quoted earlier as follows: "The fundamental difference between Islamic government and constitutional monarchies and republics is this: whereas the representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish legislation belongs exclusively to God Almighty...No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator."[7]
These serious differences in understanding of the constitutional process and the meaning of the constitution in national life have obviously had profound consequences for Muslim societies. They have most significantly affected the rights of women and religious minorities. But more broadly, they have often stymied the development of genuine constitutionalism or they have led to the demise of the constitutional enterprise altogether. The experiences of Iran and Pakistan, two countries with the longest running experiments in Islamic constitutionalism, are telling.
By Sohail Hashmi (Feb 1, 2013)
CONSTITUTIONALISM & ISLAM
The Clash of Higher Laws
===================
But this is the very issue upon which Western constitutionalism and Islamic constitutionalism encounter some nettlesome issues of reconcilability. Western constitutionalism posits the existence of a higher law grounded in human reason. Two factors were determinative in giving rise to the idea of constitutionalism: a robust notion of natural law, on the one hand, and a relatively weak idea of divine law in Christianity, on the other. The theoretical foundation of constitutionalism in the West is the natural law tradition of the ancient Greeks and Romans, particularly the Stoics. The natural law tradition flowed from the Romans into the works of the great philosophers of the Western Church, who found little by way of divine legislation in the life or teachings of Christ to challenge it. Enlightenment philosophers, particularly Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, shifted the emphasis in natural law thinking from duties to rights. In this framework, the constitution is the scripture of a civil religion, but because it originates in the mind of man, this scripture is assumed to be inherently and endlessly interpretable by human beings.
In contrast, the Islamic heritage bequeaths to modern constitution writers a relatively weak idea of natural law, on the one hand, and a robust notion of divine law, on the other. The higher law of the man-made constitution thus has the potential to clash with the higher law of God, the Sharia. And insofar as the Sharia is understood to contain specific and immutable legal rulings, as it is according to many influential theorists, this clash seriously limits the ability of Muslim reformers to revise the Sharia according to their understanding of what good government and human rights require.
This clash has ancient roots in the Islamic intellectual tradition. Perhaps from the time of the prophet Muhammad himself, the Quran was viewed in part as an expression of divine law. The Quranic text may not explicate a constitution for the Islamic state, but it does contain verses on a variety of subjects, ranging from marriage and inheritance to war and peace, that have legal import. Some injunctions are preceded by the words kutiba 'alaykum ("it is written for you"), suggesting that God is directly legislating for humanity.
As long as the Prophet lived among his people, there was no question as to the supreme interpretive agent for divine revelation. The problem that confronted the Muslim community immediately after Muhammad's death was how to interpret the Quran, particularly when verses are ambiguous or apparently contradictory, and what normative value, if any, to give the sunna, the sum total of Muhammad's prophethood in words and deeds. Ibn Khaldun notes in the Muqaddima that the four legal schools that had coalesced in Sunni Islam by the fourteenth century were characterized by the degree to which they championed reason over tradition. The Hanafis favored the use of opinion (ra'y) and analogy (qiyas), while the Malikis relied on traditions, especially the living tradition of the Medinan Muslims who were assumed to preserve most faithfully the sunna of the Prophet and his companions. The Shafi'is attempted to synthesize these two approaches, but their synthesis clearly favored the champions of tradition over opinion. The last school to emerge, the Hanbali, continued this trend toward reliance on the Quranic text and its interpretation through the hadiths of the Prophet. But, as Ibn Khaldun makes clear, the proponents of tradition did not disavow all interpretive activity (ijtihad) by qualified jurists because the jurist's task was to illuminate Sharia by his jurisprudence. He notes caustically that the literalists, or Zahiris, who shunned ijtihad, failed to establish a lasting school, and were only occasionally followed by "worthless people."[4]
The early controversies in jurisprudence were mirrored by bitter disputes in speculative theology (kalam). Mu'tazili theologians advocated ethical objectivism, that truth and falsehood, right and wrong, are objective categories, discernible by human reason and independent of God's will. Influenced by Aristotelian philosophy and possibly reacting to theological disputations with their Christian counterparts in Syria and Iraq, the Mu'tazilis were trying to reconcile Greco-Roman natural law arguments with Islamic conceptions of divine law.
The Mu'tazili faith in reason was vociferously challenged by other schools. The Maturidi school accepted reason as a source of moral knowledge, but held that the Mu'tazili position relied excessively on it over revelation. The Maturidi view was a middle ground of sorts between the Mu'tazilis and their fiercest critics, the Ash'aris. In opposition to the Mu'tazilis' embrace of ethical objectivism, the Ash'aris held that God's power could not be subject to any objective ethical values; rather, ethical value was derived entirely from God's command. Man discovers right action through God's grace to his creation, through the scriptures and the actions of divinely inspired prophets. These sources of divine law are the only arbiters of the moral content of specific actions. Without the light of the Sharia, humans cannot be sure that an action is good or bad.
By the end of the twelfth century, for reasons more political than intellectual, the Ash'ari position had emerged as dominant in Sunni Islam. Maturidism remained influential, particularly in areas ruled by Turkic dynasties in Anatolia and central and southern Asia. Mu'tazilism lingered in some Sunni circles, but its impact was greatest on the evolution of Shi'i jurisprudence, which underwent its own controversy between traditionalists and rationalists, ending in the eighteenth century with the triumph of the latter. In Sunni Islam the ascendancy of the Ash'ari position had profound consequences for the evolution of Islamic conceptions of law and ethics.
A moral epistemology rooted in revelation is intrinsically conservative. Those most familiar with revelation, the ulema (religious scholars), were placed in a privileged position to interpret the faith to the mass of the faithful. Confronted as they were with political instability and pressures to interpret the law in ways favorable to those in power, the ulema naturally tended toward greater conservatism in their legal interpretation. One could say they upheld the Sharia as a higher law above human tampering and expedient interpretations. But, in this Islamic context, the higher law that was being upheld was rooted in conceptions of divine, not natural law. The "closing of the gates of ijtihad" was an event more mythic than real—as legal interpretation certainly continued—but behind the myth lies an undeniable reality: the ethos that gripped Sunni legal scholarship was deeply resistant to change or critical inquiry. Ibn Khaldun has some pointed comments on this development: "(Scholars) came to profess their inability (to apply independent judgment), and had the people adopt the tradition of the (authorities) mentioned and of the respective group of adherents of each. . . . The person who would claim independent judgment nowadays would be frustrated and have no adherents."[5]
As development and even reinterpretation of the Sharia became more and more restricted, while Muslim societies continued to change and encounter new challenges, extra-Sharia legislation developed parallel with it. This siyasa shar'iyya or qanun created, in effect, an ever-increasing sphere of secular law. As the qanun expanded in scope, the Sharia contracted—in practice, not in theory. In theory, qanun was the realm of man-made laws, tolerated by ulema for pragmatic or utilitarian purposes but never as a substitute for the ideal divine law.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the ideology of constitutionalism began to creep into Islamic political thought as more and more Muslims visited and studied in Europe. The need to reopen the Sharia to reinterpretation and reform was one of the driving forces underlying the advocacy of constitutionalism among reformers. For these men, constitutionalism was the supreme manifestation of neo-ijtihad, a legitimate vehicle for the reconceptualization of Islamic polity and the creation of new and more effective political institutions that reflect the true purposes of an Islamic ethical system. But from the beginning, the reformers faced concerted opposition from many ulema and other conservatives, who viewed constitutionalism as the latest assault on the sacred law. According to this view of Islamic polity, the Quran and Prophetic sunna provide the immutable Islamic "constitution," and human engagement with these sources is limited to "law finding" rather than lawmaking. In his treatise Islamic Law and Constitution, Abu al-A'la Mawdudi declared: "It is beyond the purview of any legislature of an Islamic state to legislate in contravention of the directives of God and His Prophet, and all such pieces of legislation, even though approved by the legislature would ispo facto be considered ultra vires of the Constitution."[6] And Ayatollah Khomeini continued his statement quoted earlier as follows: "The fundamental difference between Islamic government and constitutional monarchies and republics is this: whereas the representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish legislation belongs exclusively to God Almighty...No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator."[7]
These serious differences in understanding of the constitutional process and the meaning of the constitution in national life have obviously had profound consequences for Muslim societies. They have most significantly affected the rights of women and religious minorities. But more broadly, they have often stymied the development of genuine constitutionalism or they have led to the demise of the constitutional enterprise altogether. The experiences of Iran and Pakistan, two countries with the longest running experiments in Islamic constitutionalism, are telling.
By Sohail Hashmi (Feb 1, 2013)
#126
Discussions / ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM I
July 07, 2013, 02:42:39 AM
ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
PART 1 OF 3
The Arab Spring has ushered in a new round of constitution making in Arab states, but will it also bring a new era of constitutionalism? Virtually all of the forty-four or so Muslim-majority states have embraced the idea that a constitution is an essential feature of modern governance. Nearly all have promulgated formal constitutions, and most began drafting a constitution as one of their first tasks immediately after independence. Yet, as we all know, it is one thing to promulgate a constitution and quite another to inculcate constitutionalism and to establish a constitutional system of government. The history of constitutionalism in Muslim countries is rather bleak. None so far has managed to instill a tradition of constitutionalism, and many could be held up as examples of the abject failure of constitutional government. There are certainly some encouraging signs that perhaps constitutionalism is developing in states such as Indonesia and Turkey. Both nations are overwhelmingly Muslim but have long pursued officially secular politics. Constitutionalism has fared poorly in states that have officially and most visibly proclaimed themselves "Islamic," including Afghanistan under the Taliban, Iran under the ayatollahs, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This record raises the question of the compatibility of Islamic politics and constitutionalism: Is there something about "Islamic states" that makes them averse to constitutionalism?
This question has been hotly debated for decades in a related form: Is Islam compatible with democracy? Constitutionalism and democracy are conceptually related but not identical. At its core, constitutionalism is the idea that the political order is subject to a "higher law" that is beyond arbitrary or capricious human changes, whether they are suggested by an autocrat, an oligarchy, a democratic mob, or even a duly constituted legislature. A constitutional system, I suggest, contains three essential features: (1) limited and accountable government, (2) adherence to the rule of law, and (3) protection of fundamental rights. So theoretically any political regime that fulfills these three criteria could be considered as fulfilling the requirements of constitutionalism. In practice, however, history shows that constitutionalism is best realized in a liberal democratic regime, in which the people periodically elect leaders who govern within the limits of enumerated or widely accepted legal powers.
Given this definition of constitutionalism, there is no obvious or inherent incompatibility between it (or, for that matter, democracy) and Islamic political theory. The very question of compatibility suggests that there is a full-blown notion of an Islamic state in Islamic political theory, whereas in reality there is nothing of the sort, in either classical or modern Islamic thought. The source of all Islamic thought, the Qur'an, is conspicuously lacking in any specifics about the structures of an Islamic state or about government in general. Similarly, the hadiths, or collected traditions of the prophet Muhammad, provide little detailed guidance on politics. More details about the Prophet's political views and behavior are found in the early biographical literature, including intriguing references to an agreement that Muhammad concluded with Muslim and Jewish groups shortly after his migration from Mecca to Medina.
This compact—dubbed the Constitution of Medina by many writers—does not outline any specifically Islamic political system. More than anything else, it establishes a unified Muslim community (umma), forges a mutual security pact among the various groups in Medina—Muslim and non-Muslim—and establishes Muhammad's role as the ultimate arbiter of disputes among the parties. The fact that neither the Qur'an nor the Prophet provided the Muslim community with an Islamic political system is evidenced by the confusion and near anarchy (at least in the Sunni version of events) created by Muhammad's unexpected death. Years later, when asked to describe how Abu Bakr became the first caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (the second caliph) described it as falta, or an unexpected, unprepared event.[1] In other words, the caliphate, the institution at the heart of classical Islamic political theory, the office to which the great political minds of the early Islamic period devoted by far the bulk of their attention, was born not through divine command or inspiration, but instead through hasty improvisation by the Medinan community.
The Qur'an and sunna (example) of the Prophet provide no constitution for an Islamic polity; what they do provide are broad ethical guidelines for the conduct of politics. Qur'an 4:59 emphasizes obedience: "O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you." But Qur'an 42:38 includes a reference to the Muslims as those who decide their affairs by mutual consultation (shura baynahum), and one widely quoted hadith has the Prophet declaring: "There is no obedience to the created in opposition to the Creator." Thus, even the broad guidelines require reconciliation and interpretation in order to construct a coherent set of ethical principles for politics. For this reason, there are today, as there have been throughout Islamic history, disputes over the details of an Islamic political order. Does Islam require a universal caliphate or are local emirates acceptable? Are monarchies contrary to Islamic principles or are democracies? Yet, regardless of the answers contemporary Muslim theorists give to these and related questions about the specifics of constitutional arrangements and procedures, they generally seem to agree on the substance of constitutionalism, namely, that Islamic government must be limited and accountable, it must adhere to and enforce the rule of law, and it must safeguard the rights of the people.
Consider, for example, the statements of two ideologically very different Muslim writers. Ayatollah Khomeini declared: Islamic government "is not a tyranny, where the head of state can deal arbitrarily with the property and lives of the people, making use of them as he wills...Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional....It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur'an and the Sunna of the Most Noble Messenger."[2] Fazlur Rahman, one of the most influential modernist scholars of the twentieth century, wrote: "To carry on their collective business (government), the Qur'an asks them [Muslims] to institute shura (a consultative council or assembly), where the will of the people can be expressed by representation....The efforts of several Muslims in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to justify and propagate the idea of a strongman rule, therefore, run in the very teeth of the Qur'an."[3] More than anything else, the vast majority of Muslim theorists would affirm the essence of constitutionalism, the contention that Islamic government must be subject to a higher law beyond the caprice of the people or their government.
PART 2 TO FOLLOW:
By Sohail Hashmi (Feb 1, 2013)
PART 1 OF 3
The Arab Spring has ushered in a new round of constitution making in Arab states, but will it also bring a new era of constitutionalism? Virtually all of the forty-four or so Muslim-majority states have embraced the idea that a constitution is an essential feature of modern governance. Nearly all have promulgated formal constitutions, and most began drafting a constitution as one of their first tasks immediately after independence. Yet, as we all know, it is one thing to promulgate a constitution and quite another to inculcate constitutionalism and to establish a constitutional system of government. The history of constitutionalism in Muslim countries is rather bleak. None so far has managed to instill a tradition of constitutionalism, and many could be held up as examples of the abject failure of constitutional government. There are certainly some encouraging signs that perhaps constitutionalism is developing in states such as Indonesia and Turkey. Both nations are overwhelmingly Muslim but have long pursued officially secular politics. Constitutionalism has fared poorly in states that have officially and most visibly proclaimed themselves "Islamic," including Afghanistan under the Taliban, Iran under the ayatollahs, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This record raises the question of the compatibility of Islamic politics and constitutionalism: Is there something about "Islamic states" that makes them averse to constitutionalism?
This question has been hotly debated for decades in a related form: Is Islam compatible with democracy? Constitutionalism and democracy are conceptually related but not identical. At its core, constitutionalism is the idea that the political order is subject to a "higher law" that is beyond arbitrary or capricious human changes, whether they are suggested by an autocrat, an oligarchy, a democratic mob, or even a duly constituted legislature. A constitutional system, I suggest, contains three essential features: (1) limited and accountable government, (2) adherence to the rule of law, and (3) protection of fundamental rights. So theoretically any political regime that fulfills these three criteria could be considered as fulfilling the requirements of constitutionalism. In practice, however, history shows that constitutionalism is best realized in a liberal democratic regime, in which the people periodically elect leaders who govern within the limits of enumerated or widely accepted legal powers.
Given this definition of constitutionalism, there is no obvious or inherent incompatibility between it (or, for that matter, democracy) and Islamic political theory. The very question of compatibility suggests that there is a full-blown notion of an Islamic state in Islamic political theory, whereas in reality there is nothing of the sort, in either classical or modern Islamic thought. The source of all Islamic thought, the Qur'an, is conspicuously lacking in any specifics about the structures of an Islamic state or about government in general. Similarly, the hadiths, or collected traditions of the prophet Muhammad, provide little detailed guidance on politics. More details about the Prophet's political views and behavior are found in the early biographical literature, including intriguing references to an agreement that Muhammad concluded with Muslim and Jewish groups shortly after his migration from Mecca to Medina.
This compact—dubbed the Constitution of Medina by many writers—does not outline any specifically Islamic political system. More than anything else, it establishes a unified Muslim community (umma), forges a mutual security pact among the various groups in Medina—Muslim and non-Muslim—and establishes Muhammad's role as the ultimate arbiter of disputes among the parties. The fact that neither the Qur'an nor the Prophet provided the Muslim community with an Islamic political system is evidenced by the confusion and near anarchy (at least in the Sunni version of events) created by Muhammad's unexpected death. Years later, when asked to describe how Abu Bakr became the first caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (the second caliph) described it as falta, or an unexpected, unprepared event.[1] In other words, the caliphate, the institution at the heart of classical Islamic political theory, the office to which the great political minds of the early Islamic period devoted by far the bulk of their attention, was born not through divine command or inspiration, but instead through hasty improvisation by the Medinan community.
The Qur'an and sunna (example) of the Prophet provide no constitution for an Islamic polity; what they do provide are broad ethical guidelines for the conduct of politics. Qur'an 4:59 emphasizes obedience: "O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you." But Qur'an 42:38 includes a reference to the Muslims as those who decide their affairs by mutual consultation (shura baynahum), and one widely quoted hadith has the Prophet declaring: "There is no obedience to the created in opposition to the Creator." Thus, even the broad guidelines require reconciliation and interpretation in order to construct a coherent set of ethical principles for politics. For this reason, there are today, as there have been throughout Islamic history, disputes over the details of an Islamic political order. Does Islam require a universal caliphate or are local emirates acceptable? Are monarchies contrary to Islamic principles or are democracies? Yet, regardless of the answers contemporary Muslim theorists give to these and related questions about the specifics of constitutional arrangements and procedures, they generally seem to agree on the substance of constitutionalism, namely, that Islamic government must be limited and accountable, it must adhere to and enforce the rule of law, and it must safeguard the rights of the people.
Consider, for example, the statements of two ideologically very different Muslim writers. Ayatollah Khomeini declared: Islamic government "is not a tyranny, where the head of state can deal arbitrarily with the property and lives of the people, making use of them as he wills...Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional....It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur'an and the Sunna of the Most Noble Messenger."[2] Fazlur Rahman, one of the most influential modernist scholars of the twentieth century, wrote: "To carry on their collective business (government), the Qur'an asks them [Muslims] to institute shura (a consultative council or assembly), where the will of the people can be expressed by representation....The efforts of several Muslims in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to justify and propagate the idea of a strongman rule, therefore, run in the very teeth of the Qur'an."[3] More than anything else, the vast majority of Muslim theorists would affirm the essence of constitutionalism, the contention that Islamic government must be subject to a higher law beyond the caprice of the people or their government.
PART 2 TO FOLLOW:
By Sohail Hashmi (Feb 1, 2013)
#127
Discussions / BLASPHEMY AND THE QURAN
July 06, 2013, 12:29:56 PM
Peace to all,
"In Islam, blasphemy is a subject of intellectual discussion rather than a subject of physical punishment. This concept is very clear in the Quran.
The Quran tells us that since ancient times God has sent prophets in succession to every town and every community. It says, moreover, that the contemporaries of all of these prophets adopted a negative attitude towards them.
There are more than 200 verses in the Quran, which reveal that the contemporaries of the prophets repeatedly perpetrated the same act, which is now called 'blasphemy or abuse of the Prophet' or 'using abusive language about the Prophet'. Prophets, down the ages, have been mocked and abused by their contemporaries (036:030); some of the epithets cited in the Quran include "a liar" (040:024), "possessed" (015:006), "a fabricator" (016:101), "a foolish man" (007:066). The Quran mentions these words of abuse used by prophets' contemporaries but nowhere does the Quran prescribe the punishment of lashes, or death, or any other physical punishment.
This clearly shows that 'abuse of the Prophet' is not a subject of punishment, but is rather a subject of peaceful admonishment. That is, one who is guilty of abusing the Prophet should not have corporal punishment meted out to him: he should rather be given sound arguments in order to address his mind. In other words, peaceful persuasion should be used to reform the person concerned rather than trying to punish him.
Those who adopt a negative stance towards the Prophet will be judged by God, who knows the innermost recesses of their hearts. The responsibility of the believers is to observe the policy of avoidance and, wishing well, convey the message of God to them in such a manner that their minds might be properly addressed.
Another important aspect of this matter is that at no point in the Quran is it stated that anyone who uses abusive language about the Prophet should be stopped from doing so, and that in case he continues to do so he should be awarded severe punishment. On the contrary, the Quran commands the believer not to use abusive language directed against opponents: "But do not revile those [beings] whom they invoke instead of God, lest they, in their hostility, revile God and out of ignorance" (006:108).
This verse of the Quran makes it plain that it is not the task of the believers to establish "media watch" offices and hunt for anyone involved in acts of defamation of the Prophet, and then plan for their killing, whatever the cost. On the contrary, the Quran enjoins believers to sedulously refrain from indulging in such acts as may provoke people to retaliate by abusing Islam and the Prophet. This injunction of the Quran makes it clear that this responsibility devolves upon the believers, rather than holding others responsible and demanding that they be punished.
Looked at from this angle, the stance of present-day Muslims goes totally against the teachings of the Quran. Whenever anyone - in their judgment - commits an act of 'abuse of the Prophet', in speech or in writing, they instantly get provoked and respond by leading processions through the streets, which often turn violent. And then they demand that all those who insult the Prophet be beheaded.
Muslims generally advocate the theory that freedom of expression is good, but that no one has the right to hurt the religious sentiments of others. This theory is quite illogical. Freedom is not a self-acquired right. It is God, who, because of His scheme of putting man to the test, has given man total freedom.
Then the modern secular concept of freedom is that everyone is free provided he does not inflict physical harm upon others. In such a situation, the above kind of demand is tantamount to abolishing two things: firstly, to abolishing the divine scheme, and secondly, to abolishing the modern secular norm. Neither goal is achievable. So the hue and cry against the so-called abuse of the Prophet is simply untenable. By adopting this policy, Muslims can make themselves permanently negative but they cannot change the system of the world.
BLASPHEMY BACKGROUND:
=====================
Given that the exact definition of the terms that denoted blasphemy are not specified in the Quran and Sunna, sectarian and doctrinal disputes among early Muslims provided subsequent jurists and theologians the opportunity to explore the implications of blasphemy even further. Jurists, scholars and ordinary Muslims who claimed that their own position on Islam was normative, began to characterize dissenting Muslims as apostates, blasphemers, hypocrites, or unbelievers. Thus, a charge of blasphemy and apostasy was often used to impose or refute certain doctrines or theological positions.
For instance, the Ash'aris claimed that the Quran was the uncreated word of Allah, whereas the Mu'tazilis refuted that view. This theological point was debated in the ninth and tenth centuries. The Muslim community was polarized between those who believed that the Quran was the created word of Allah Most High and Exalted, and those who believed that the Qur'an was the uncreated word of Allah. Both sides charged the other with blasphemy.
Similarly, the Mu'tazili stance over Allah's attributes, the philosophers' controversy over the nature of punishment in the Hereafter, the early Shi'i contention over the alleged omission of certain verses from the Qur'an and the Sufi belief in seeking oneness with Allah Most High and Exalted frequently elicited charges of blasphemy or heresy. Since unbelievers, heretics, or apostates by definition did not belong to the Muslim community, a Muslim who acted against such a person would be supported by the community, even if he took the law into his hands and killed the alleged offender without being mandated by the religious authority.
Gradually, a plethora of "apostasy list" was formulated which was fluid and often quite ambiguous. Thus, the contemporary definition of terms connected to blasphemy are the result of a long process of development and refinement. The legal consequences of such accusations were very serious. Depending on where one is and the school of law one follows, it is blasphemy:
- to speak ill of Allah Most High and Exalted,
- to find fault with the Prophet Muhammad upon him be peace and blessings
- to slight any prophet who is mentioned in the Quran, any member of Prophet Muhammad's family, or any cleric.
- to draw a picture to represent Prophet Muhammad upon him be peace and blessings or any other prophet, or to make a film which features a prophet.
- to write the Prophet Muhammad's name on the walls of a toilet.
- to state facts such as Prophet Muhammad's parents were not Muslims.
- to find fault with Islam.
- to say Islam is an Arab religion; prayers five times a day are unnecessary; and the Qur'an is full of lies (Indonesia).
- to believe in transmigration of the soul or reincarnation or to disbelieve in the afterlife.
- to find fault with a belief or a practice which the Muslim community (umma) has adopted.
- to find fault with or to curse apostles, prophets, or angels. to express an atheist or a secular point of view or to publish or to distribute such a point of view.- for non-Muslims to use words that Muslims use (Malaysia).
- to pray for Muslims to become something else.
- to whistle during prayers (Indonesia).
- to flout the rules prescribed for Ramadan.
- to recite Muslim prayers in a language other than Arabic (Indonesia).
- to be alone with persons of the opposite sex who are not blood relatives.
- to find amusement in Islamic customs (Bangladesh) to publish an unofficial translation of the Quran.
- to practice yoga (Malaysia).
- to watch a film or to listen to music (Somalia).
Blasphemy against artefacts
===================
It is blasphemy:
- for a non-Muslim to touch a Quran or to touch something that has touched a Quran.
- for anyone to damage a Quran or other books of importance to Islam, for example,
hadith.
- to spit at the wall of a mosque.
- To set up intermediaries between oneself and Allah Most High and Exalted, making
supplication to them, seeking their intercession with Allah Most High and Exalted, and placing one's trust in them is unbelief (Saeed, Freedom, 44-8).
The above list indicates the fluid nature of the terms associated with blasphemy and
apostasy and that jurists were not in agreement as to what constitutes blasphemy.
NOTE: Extracts, narration, paraphrases and replication from multiple sources. Please contact LMU if you require references
"In Islam, blasphemy is a subject of intellectual discussion rather than a subject of physical punishment. This concept is very clear in the Quran.
The Quran tells us that since ancient times God has sent prophets in succession to every town and every community. It says, moreover, that the contemporaries of all of these prophets adopted a negative attitude towards them.
There are more than 200 verses in the Quran, which reveal that the contemporaries of the prophets repeatedly perpetrated the same act, which is now called 'blasphemy or abuse of the Prophet' or 'using abusive language about the Prophet'. Prophets, down the ages, have been mocked and abused by their contemporaries (036:030); some of the epithets cited in the Quran include "a liar" (040:024), "possessed" (015:006), "a fabricator" (016:101), "a foolish man" (007:066). The Quran mentions these words of abuse used by prophets' contemporaries but nowhere does the Quran prescribe the punishment of lashes, or death, or any other physical punishment.
This clearly shows that 'abuse of the Prophet' is not a subject of punishment, but is rather a subject of peaceful admonishment. That is, one who is guilty of abusing the Prophet should not have corporal punishment meted out to him: he should rather be given sound arguments in order to address his mind. In other words, peaceful persuasion should be used to reform the person concerned rather than trying to punish him.
Those who adopt a negative stance towards the Prophet will be judged by God, who knows the innermost recesses of their hearts. The responsibility of the believers is to observe the policy of avoidance and, wishing well, convey the message of God to them in such a manner that their minds might be properly addressed.
Another important aspect of this matter is that at no point in the Quran is it stated that anyone who uses abusive language about the Prophet should be stopped from doing so, and that in case he continues to do so he should be awarded severe punishment. On the contrary, the Quran commands the believer not to use abusive language directed against opponents: "But do not revile those [beings] whom they invoke instead of God, lest they, in their hostility, revile God and out of ignorance" (006:108).
This verse of the Quran makes it plain that it is not the task of the believers to establish "media watch" offices and hunt for anyone involved in acts of defamation of the Prophet, and then plan for their killing, whatever the cost. On the contrary, the Quran enjoins believers to sedulously refrain from indulging in such acts as may provoke people to retaliate by abusing Islam and the Prophet. This injunction of the Quran makes it clear that this responsibility devolves upon the believers, rather than holding others responsible and demanding that they be punished.
Looked at from this angle, the stance of present-day Muslims goes totally against the teachings of the Quran. Whenever anyone - in their judgment - commits an act of 'abuse of the Prophet', in speech or in writing, they instantly get provoked and respond by leading processions through the streets, which often turn violent. And then they demand that all those who insult the Prophet be beheaded.
Muslims generally advocate the theory that freedom of expression is good, but that no one has the right to hurt the religious sentiments of others. This theory is quite illogical. Freedom is not a self-acquired right. It is God, who, because of His scheme of putting man to the test, has given man total freedom.
Then the modern secular concept of freedom is that everyone is free provided he does not inflict physical harm upon others. In such a situation, the above kind of demand is tantamount to abolishing two things: firstly, to abolishing the divine scheme, and secondly, to abolishing the modern secular norm. Neither goal is achievable. So the hue and cry against the so-called abuse of the Prophet is simply untenable. By adopting this policy, Muslims can make themselves permanently negative but they cannot change the system of the world.
BLASPHEMY BACKGROUND:
=====================
Given that the exact definition of the terms that denoted blasphemy are not specified in the Quran and Sunna, sectarian and doctrinal disputes among early Muslims provided subsequent jurists and theologians the opportunity to explore the implications of blasphemy even further. Jurists, scholars and ordinary Muslims who claimed that their own position on Islam was normative, began to characterize dissenting Muslims as apostates, blasphemers, hypocrites, or unbelievers. Thus, a charge of blasphemy and apostasy was often used to impose or refute certain doctrines or theological positions.
For instance, the Ash'aris claimed that the Quran was the uncreated word of Allah, whereas the Mu'tazilis refuted that view. This theological point was debated in the ninth and tenth centuries. The Muslim community was polarized between those who believed that the Quran was the created word of Allah Most High and Exalted, and those who believed that the Qur'an was the uncreated word of Allah. Both sides charged the other with blasphemy.
Similarly, the Mu'tazili stance over Allah's attributes, the philosophers' controversy over the nature of punishment in the Hereafter, the early Shi'i contention over the alleged omission of certain verses from the Qur'an and the Sufi belief in seeking oneness with Allah Most High and Exalted frequently elicited charges of blasphemy or heresy. Since unbelievers, heretics, or apostates by definition did not belong to the Muslim community, a Muslim who acted against such a person would be supported by the community, even if he took the law into his hands and killed the alleged offender without being mandated by the religious authority.
Gradually, a plethora of "apostasy list" was formulated which was fluid and often quite ambiguous. Thus, the contemporary definition of terms connected to blasphemy are the result of a long process of development and refinement. The legal consequences of such accusations were very serious. Depending on where one is and the school of law one follows, it is blasphemy:
- to speak ill of Allah Most High and Exalted,
- to find fault with the Prophet Muhammad upon him be peace and blessings
- to slight any prophet who is mentioned in the Quran, any member of Prophet Muhammad's family, or any cleric.
- to draw a picture to represent Prophet Muhammad upon him be peace and blessings or any other prophet, or to make a film which features a prophet.
- to write the Prophet Muhammad's name on the walls of a toilet.
- to state facts such as Prophet Muhammad's parents were not Muslims.
- to find fault with Islam.
- to say Islam is an Arab religion; prayers five times a day are unnecessary; and the Qur'an is full of lies (Indonesia).
- to believe in transmigration of the soul or reincarnation or to disbelieve in the afterlife.
- to find fault with a belief or a practice which the Muslim community (umma) has adopted.
- to find fault with or to curse apostles, prophets, or angels. to express an atheist or a secular point of view or to publish or to distribute such a point of view.- for non-Muslims to use words that Muslims use (Malaysia).
- to pray for Muslims to become something else.
- to whistle during prayers (Indonesia).
- to flout the rules prescribed for Ramadan.
- to recite Muslim prayers in a language other than Arabic (Indonesia).
- to be alone with persons of the opposite sex who are not blood relatives.
- to find amusement in Islamic customs (Bangladesh) to publish an unofficial translation of the Quran.
- to practice yoga (Malaysia).
- to watch a film or to listen to music (Somalia).
Blasphemy against artefacts
===================
It is blasphemy:
- for a non-Muslim to touch a Quran or to touch something that has touched a Quran.
- for anyone to damage a Quran or other books of importance to Islam, for example,
hadith.
- to spit at the wall of a mosque.
- To set up intermediaries between oneself and Allah Most High and Exalted, making
supplication to them, seeking their intercession with Allah Most High and Exalted, and placing one's trust in them is unbelief (Saeed, Freedom, 44-8).
The above list indicates the fluid nature of the terms associated with blasphemy and
apostasy and that jurists were not in agreement as to what constitutes blasphemy.
NOTE: Extracts, narration, paraphrases and replication from multiple sources. Please contact LMU if you require references
#128
Discussions / Re: early Muslim community after the Prophet
June 28, 2013, 08:16:15 AM
Salaam Sardar,
First, let me claim my God given gender. Please don't call me brother anymore; you have been corrected several times before.
Second, I have already posted his view in quotations. That's it. Only the subject is my mine. He comments at the MPV site.
Peace
First, let me claim my God given gender. Please don't call me brother anymore; you have been corrected several times before.
Second, I have already posted his view in quotations. That's it. Only the subject is my mine. He comments at the MPV site.
Peace
#129
Discussions / early Muslim community after the Prophet
June 25, 2013, 01:11:45 AM
Salaam and greetings of Peace,
I am sharing Frank Parmir's post today at Muslims for Progressive Values. He's got a very good, rational point.
"Among the early Muslim records there are reports that Ali was not consulted when the successor to Muhammad was chosen. Among them also are reports that there was much enmity between Aisha and Ali.
And, it is reported that within the early Muslim community there was a substantial amount of intrigue and even murder.
If these reports are true, why should we pattern our Islam on the early Muslims? Their community seems to have included many examples of exclusion and enmity!
If these reports are untrue, which of the early Muslim records can we trust? How can these reports be the basis of our Islam?
Is not our Islam totally reliant on our understanding of the Qur'an and and the Inner Light that God provides?
If we are found wanting, we can claim that we were just following what we found our fathers and mothers doing.
But we are advised by the Qur'an that such an excuse will be insufficient to gain pardon."
I am sharing Frank Parmir's post today at Muslims for Progressive Values. He's got a very good, rational point.
"Among the early Muslim records there are reports that Ali was not consulted when the successor to Muhammad was chosen. Among them also are reports that there was much enmity between Aisha and Ali.
And, it is reported that within the early Muslim community there was a substantial amount of intrigue and even murder.
If these reports are true, why should we pattern our Islam on the early Muslims? Their community seems to have included many examples of exclusion and enmity!
If these reports are untrue, which of the early Muslim records can we trust? How can these reports be the basis of our Islam?
Is not our Islam totally reliant on our understanding of the Qur'an and and the Inner Light that God provides?
If we are found wanting, we can claim that we were just following what we found our fathers and mothers doing.
But we are advised by the Qur'an that such an excuse will be insufficient to gain pardon."
#131
Discussions / human rights and social justice
June 18, 2013, 01:04:21 AMFor Immediate Release. Please share.
Re: Saudi human rights activists, Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni sentenced to 10 months in prison and two year travel ban upon endeavoring to aide Canadian, Nathalie Morin and her children.
(Ottawa, Canada – June 17, 2013) - Muslims for Progressive Values MPV Ummah Canada (MPV Canada) calls upon Canadian and Saudi authorities to immediately demand and obtain the release of Saudi human rights activists, Wajeha Al-Huwaider and Fawzia Al-Oyouni and guarantee the freedom and safety of Canadian, Nathalie Morin and her children.
At MPV Canada we support women's agency and self-determination in every aspect of their lives. We affirm that justice and compassion should be the guiding principles for all aspects of human conduct. We repudiate militarism and violence, whether on an individual, organizational, or national level. We are committed to work toward societies that ensure social, political, educational, and economic opportunities for all. We believe that freedom of conscience is not only essential to all human societies but integral to the Qur'anic view of humanity. We believe that secular government is the only way to achieve the Islamic ideal of freedom from compulsion in matters of faith.
At MPV Canada we are shocked and appalled at the recent Saudi Court decision in which Saudi human rights activists, Wajeha Al-Huwaider and Fawzia Al-Oyouni were sentenced to ten months in prison along with a two year travel ban for the offence of "trying to sabotage the marital relationship" between Canadian, Nathalie Morin, formerly of Montreal and her Saudi husband "and abetting her to escape".
According to The Gulf Centre for Human Rights (http://gc4hr.org/news/view/437 ) :
- on June 7, 2011, Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni, received a text message saying that Canadian, Nathalie Morin and her three children were being subjected to violence and that her Saudi husband had locked them in the house. The text message also said that the children were starving of hunger.
- Shortly thereafter, Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni brought food to Morin's house and discovered that the husband had trapped them (as well) after he discovered and seized the mobile handset from which Morin had sent the text message.
- When the Saudi police arrived they arrested Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni on charges of trying to smuggle the wife and her three children away from her husband.
Following sentencing, Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni declared in a statement issued June 15, 2013:
"It was clear to us from the very beginning when we were summoned to the investigation by the prosecutor in Dammam (Saudi Arabia) that the issue was malicious and those who moved this case against us from the concerned authorities wanted to harm and harass us, and stop our humanitarian activities, because that case since the night in which it occurred two years ago, had been revoked by order of the Amir of the Eastern region and closed the file..."
"Finally we will appeal this judgment at the Court of Appeal, and we will raise our objection to it."
According to The Gulf Centre for Human Rights Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni:
"have been targeted with fabricated charges that lack proper evidence solely due to their long, ongoing defense of women's rights in the country and their active participation in women's rights campaign in addition to their demand of the right of women to drive a car."
MPV supports the Gulf Centre for Human Rights in its demand on the authorities in Saudi Arabia to:
1. Immediately and unconditionally drop all charges against Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni and quash the prison sentences against them, and safely release them;
2. Immediately and unconditionally remove the travel ban imposed on Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni;
3. Reconsider the legal codifications of "Takhbib" or inciting women against their husbands, as this practice is judged without safe and protective legal measures. Additionally, most women rights' defenders would be liable if attempting to help women in domestic distress; additionally, it has no basis in Islam.
4. Guarantee in all circumstances that all human rights defenders in Saudi Arabia are able to carry out their legitimate human rights activities without fear of reprisals and free of all restrictions including judicial harassment.
MPV joins the Gulf Centre for Human Rights in reminding the authorities of Saudi Arabia that Saudi Arabia is bound by the United Nations Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1998, and recognizes the legitimacy of the activities of human rights defenders, their right to freedom of association and to carry out their activities without fear of reprisals, specifically providing at:
Articles 5 (c): "For the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, at the national and international levels: (c) To communicate with non-governmental or intergovernmental organizations" and
Article 6 (c): "Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others: (c) To study, discuss, form and hold opinions on the observance, both in law and in practice, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and, through these and other appropriate means, to draw public attention to those matters."
MPV calls upon Prime Minister Stephen Harper, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz bin Saud, and all other relevant Canadian and Saudi authorities to immediately demand and obtain the release of both Al-Huwaider and Al-Oyouni and guarantee the freedom and safety of Canadian, Nathalie Morin and her children.
Muslims for Progressive Values MPV Ummah Canada
Chair: Shahla Khan Salter
www.mpvottawa.com
email: mpvottawa@gmail.com
613 262 28798
This statement is being distributed to the following authorities:
Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
c/o The Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Canada, Osamah Al Sanosi Ahmad:
amboffice.ott@mofa.gov.sa
Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
FAX: 1-401-1336
Prime Minister Stephen Harper: pm@pm.gc.ca
Ambassador to Canada in Saudi Arabia, Thomas MacDonald, ryadh@international.gc.ca
Minister of Consular Affairs, Diane Ablonczy: diane.ablonczy@parl.gc.ca
Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Baird: john.baird@parl.gc.ca
Minister for the Status of Women, Rona Ambrose: rona.ambrose@parl.gc.ca
Leader of the Opposition Thomas Mulcair: thomas.mulcair@parl.gc.ca
Opposition Critic Consular Affairs and Foreign Affairs, Paul Dewar: paul.dewar@parl.gc.ca
Opposition Critic for Women, Niki Ashton: Niki.ashton@parl.gc.ca
Opposition Critic for Justice and Human Rights, Francoise Boivin: Francoise.Boivin@parl.gc.ca
Liberal Opposition Leader, Justin Trudeau: justin.trudeau@parl.gc.ca
This statement is being sent to the following human rights organizations and allies of MPV Canada:
Amnesty International Canada, Alex Neve
Canadian Unitarians for Social Justice, Rev. Frances Deverell
Human Rights Watch Beirut, Nadya Khalife
Human Rights Watch Canada, Jasmine Herlt
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Sukanya Pillay
CAIR, Ihsaan Gardee
The Gulf Centre for Human Rights
The Saudi Center for Democracy and Human Rights
The Toronto Unity Mosque El-Tawhid Juma Circle, El-Farouk Khaki
The Canadian Council of Muslim Women, Alia Hogben
Muslims for Progressive Values USA, Ani Zonneveld
Muslims for Progressive Values France, Ludovic Mohamed-Zahed
Muslims for Progressive Values Chile, Vanessa Rivera de la Fuente Nasreen Amina
Muslims for Progressive Values Australia, Shawon T. Khan
The Nathalie Morin Support Committee, Johanne Durocher
#132
Discussions / understanding gender
June 16, 2013, 01:24:03 AMPeace,
Here is an another view to ponder upon
http://newageislam.com/islam,-women-and-feminism/the-moderate-muslim-misogynist/d/11936
#133
Discussions / gender equality in Islam
June 13, 2013, 06:10:18 AM
Peace,
GENDER EQUALITY IN ISLAM
==================
003:195 "I shall not lose sight of the labor of any of you who labors in My way, be it man or woman; each of you is equal to the other"
Spiritual equality, responsibility and accountability for both men and women is a well-developed theme in the Quran. Spiritual equality between men and women in the sight of God is not limited to purely spiritual, religious issues, but is the basis for equality in all temporal aspects of human endeavor.
Adam and Eve: Gender Equality
The concept of gender equality is best exemplified in the Quranic rendition of Adam and Eve. The Quran states that both sexes were deliberate and independent and there is no mention of Eve being created out of Adam's rib or anything else. Even in the issue of which sex was created first is not specified, implying that for our purpose in this world, it may not matter.
004:001 "O mankind! Be conscious of your Sustainer, who has created you out of one living entity (nafs), and out of it created its mate, and out of hte two spread abroad a multitude of men and women. And remain conscious of God, in whose name you demand your rights from one another, and of these ties of kinship. Verily, God is ever watchful over you! "
Quranic translators disagree on the meaning of "nafs" in the above verse which Muhammad Asad translates as "living entity." Many claim that "nafs" translates as "person," that is, Adam. But according to Asad and other scholars, God created humankind and its sexual counterpart out of its own kind. The Arabic word referring to mate (zawj) in the above Quranic verse is grammatically neutral and can be applied both ot male and female interchangeably. So it is not clear, nor should we conjecture, that Adam was created first, Eve was created out of Adam, or that Eve/woman is innately subservient to Adam/man. The fact that this Quranic verse does not specify one specific sex over the other is proof of gender non-bias and equality. It is commonly (and mistakenly) argued that Adam was created first, and that by this gesture God finds the male dominant and superior to the female; however, the wording of the Quran in the aforementioned verse does not support this claim.
The Quran describes how Adam and Eve were told to avoid a specific tree, which they both approached. For this act of disobedience to God, they were consequently banished from the garden; however, later both repented and were forgiven by God. The Quran does not allude to Eve tempting Adam to eat from the tree and being responsible for their downfall. In the Quranic version, both were held accountable and both paid the price for their choices, proving that gender equality is an intrinsic part of Islamic belief. (See 002:030-037)
Accountability, Independence, and Freedom of Choice
================================
Women are independent individuals, as exemplified by the fact that all human beings will be accountable for their own intentions and deeds on the Day of Judgment when "no human being shall be of the least avail to another human being" (82:19) If men were ultimately responsibile for women (fathers for their daughters, husbands for their wives, etc.), then this accountability would be solely on men's shoulders to bear until the Day of Judgment. But this is not the case:
006:165 "And whatever wrong any human being commits rests upon himself alone; and no bearer of burdens shall be made to bear another's burden..."
Consequently, we cannot be judged according to our own deeds unless we have the freedom of choice to do so. This free choice carries with it the responsibility to make the right choices or paying the consequence for wrong ones, best exemplified by Adam and Eve.
Equality in Practice
===========
In the Quran, reference to men and women is through attributes and deeds, by which we will be judged. The most pious of us, or those who follow God's commands, are referred to as "believers" or "mu'mineen" (pl.) in the Quran. In many references, in fact, the Quran resonates this equality by eloquently repeating "men and women" with ethical and practical qualities throughout the verses, and even emphasizes this ten times in the following verse:
033:035 "Verily for all men and women who have surrendered themselves unto God, and all believing men and believing women, and all truly devout men and truly devout women, and all men and women who are true to their word, and all men and women who are patient in adversity, and all men and women who humble themselves before God, and all men and women who give in charity, and all self-denying men and self-denying women, and all men and women who are mindful of their chastity, and all men and women who remmber God unceasingly: for all of them has God readied forgiveness of sins and a mighty reward."
It is paramount to understand that the Quran equates being a "mu'min" (sing.) with actual practice, so that it is not enough to just have faith in principle; we must put our faith into practice. The same applies to our belief in the equality of men and women; gender equality as outlined in the Quran must also be put into practice. In reference to the above verse, modern scholar Laila Ahmed in "Women and Gender in Islam" says that "the implications are far-reaching. Ethical qualities, including those invoked here--charity, chastity, truthfulness, patience, piety--also have political and social dimensions."
Leila Ahmed
=======
An important and insightful academic study that needs to be read by everyone who cares about women, gender, feminism, Islam, the Middle East, or colonization. Lelia Ahmed is a superb scholar. She combines a traditional respect for the accuracy of the portrayal of the past with a sensitivity to modern theory about contested values and the political use of symbols. In this book, she provides a two-thousand-year survey of a vast region, consistently noting what still needs more research and the potential biases of her sources. She carefully traces differences of class and race within Islam and Middle Eastern societies. Historical context is absolutely critical in her account. Importantly, Ahmed is capable of recognizing contradictions and ambiguity that influence all our thinking.
Women and Gender challenges some basic assumptions about Islam and women. Ahmed clearly displays that Islam is not some sort of alien Other to western Christianity and culture. That view didn't emerge until the Crusades. Initially, both religions developed in a region connected by trade and armies. She notes the irony of "western civilization" claiming that it started in Babylon and Egypt.
Another misconception that Ahmed identifies is that Islam somehow emerged in isolation, pure and untouched by its neighbors. While Islamic leaders have always claimed authority to interpret their religion, in fact other interpretations and practices have always existed. She distinguishes between the ethical message of equality and the orthodox religious institution that established a legal hierarchy devaluing and attacking women. Muslim women, past and present, have cherished that equality at the core of their religion in a way that is difficult for non-Muslims to understand.
Both Christianity and Islam developed in a region where women were losing the respect and power they had known before the rise of nations. As their religious institutions grew, both added addition restrictions on women and both voiced real misogyny against them. The changing times can be seen in the contrast between Mohamed's first wife, a wealthy widow and merchant and his later wives and concubines who were secluded. After his death, his wives were able to continue to play important roles in the formalization of religious teaching, but soon such female power was lost. As the Muslim empire grow , it conquered neighboring countries taking many women as slaves and adapting other nations' traditions of concubinage and harems. Women lost public power and even the language changed, blurring lines between the words for woman, sexual partner, and slave. Despite internal challenges, the place of women within Islam changed little until European involvement in the region increased in the nineteenth century.
In her treatment of the colonialism of the past two centuries, Ahmed focuses her account on Egypt. In doing so, she hopes to make her topic manageable, and she sees Egypt as both a forerunner and representative of patterns which would occur throughout the Middle East. Her choice also allows her to quote the outrageous comments of the British colonizers and those who supported them. Englishman tried to justify their intention to destroy Islamic lifestyles by stating the need to save Muslim women from abuse by inferior Muslim men. In doing so they co-opted feminism and created problems that still exist today.
The colonizers' rhetoric about the problems of women was straight out of Victorian England, despite the fact that some British officials were working against suffrage in their homeland. In Egypt they did nothing about problematic laws relating to marriage, polygamy, and segregation of women, and they cut back on education for women and girls. Instead, they claimed that the most urgent need was to stop women's use of the veil. [Ahmed lays out their logic, but it is somewhat convoluted and impossible to summarize.]
In 1898, an Egyptian man, in total support of colonization and the elimination of Egyptian culture, wrote a book entitled, "The Liberation of Women." Although still sometimes identified as the first Egyptian feminist publication, it was in fact an attack on Muslim women as too dirty and too unattractive to attract their husbands' desire and too ignorant to raise adequate sons. Those who sought to expel the British and regain control of their country argued strongly against the book. In the process, the veil came to symbolize all that was good or bad about colonization.
After surveying the conflicting forces and beliefs among Egyptians down to the present, Ahmed discusses the conflicted nature of feminism within Egypt in the early twentieth century. She recounts the waves of women entering higher education and the professions in the 1960s and 1970s, linking their expanded lives to economic and political shifts. Then she discusses the rising popularity of Islam in more recent decades, particularly among young upwardly mobile college students and graduates. Rather than labeling them as regressive, she suggests various ways in which veiling can provide a sense of protection and community as they move into unfamiliar worlds of education and urban life. She worries, however, about lack of awareness of the real dangers of Islamic political leaders using religion to curtail their options as women as they have done in Iran.
In her conclusion, Ahmed urges westerners in general and feminists in particular to re-examine what their own positions mean to those who have experienced colonization. To them we are implicated alongside those who would force their countries into various types of submission. If we focus on the sexism of the men in their community or in their political and religious structures, we can only force women to choose between their ethnicity and their womanhood—much as African-American women have been forced to choose.
===================================
NOTE: Extracts, narration, paraphrases and replication from multiple sources. Please contact LMU if you require references.
GENDER EQUALITY IN ISLAM
==================
003:195 "I shall not lose sight of the labor of any of you who labors in My way, be it man or woman; each of you is equal to the other"
Spiritual equality, responsibility and accountability for both men and women is a well-developed theme in the Quran. Spiritual equality between men and women in the sight of God is not limited to purely spiritual, religious issues, but is the basis for equality in all temporal aspects of human endeavor.
Adam and Eve: Gender Equality
The concept of gender equality is best exemplified in the Quranic rendition of Adam and Eve. The Quran states that both sexes were deliberate and independent and there is no mention of Eve being created out of Adam's rib or anything else. Even in the issue of which sex was created first is not specified, implying that for our purpose in this world, it may not matter.
004:001 "O mankind! Be conscious of your Sustainer, who has created you out of one living entity (nafs), and out of it created its mate, and out of hte two spread abroad a multitude of men and women. And remain conscious of God, in whose name you demand your rights from one another, and of these ties of kinship. Verily, God is ever watchful over you! "
Quranic translators disagree on the meaning of "nafs" in the above verse which Muhammad Asad translates as "living entity." Many claim that "nafs" translates as "person," that is, Adam. But according to Asad and other scholars, God created humankind and its sexual counterpart out of its own kind. The Arabic word referring to mate (zawj) in the above Quranic verse is grammatically neutral and can be applied both ot male and female interchangeably. So it is not clear, nor should we conjecture, that Adam was created first, Eve was created out of Adam, or that Eve/woman is innately subservient to Adam/man. The fact that this Quranic verse does not specify one specific sex over the other is proof of gender non-bias and equality. It is commonly (and mistakenly) argued that Adam was created first, and that by this gesture God finds the male dominant and superior to the female; however, the wording of the Quran in the aforementioned verse does not support this claim.
The Quran describes how Adam and Eve were told to avoid a specific tree, which they both approached. For this act of disobedience to God, they were consequently banished from the garden; however, later both repented and were forgiven by God. The Quran does not allude to Eve tempting Adam to eat from the tree and being responsible for their downfall. In the Quranic version, both were held accountable and both paid the price for their choices, proving that gender equality is an intrinsic part of Islamic belief. (See 002:030-037)
Accountability, Independence, and Freedom of Choice
================================
Women are independent individuals, as exemplified by the fact that all human beings will be accountable for their own intentions and deeds on the Day of Judgment when "no human being shall be of the least avail to another human being" (82:19) If men were ultimately responsibile for women (fathers for their daughters, husbands for their wives, etc.), then this accountability would be solely on men's shoulders to bear until the Day of Judgment. But this is not the case:
006:165 "And whatever wrong any human being commits rests upon himself alone; and no bearer of burdens shall be made to bear another's burden..."
Consequently, we cannot be judged according to our own deeds unless we have the freedom of choice to do so. This free choice carries with it the responsibility to make the right choices or paying the consequence for wrong ones, best exemplified by Adam and Eve.
Equality in Practice
===========
In the Quran, reference to men and women is through attributes and deeds, by which we will be judged. The most pious of us, or those who follow God's commands, are referred to as "believers" or "mu'mineen" (pl.) in the Quran. In many references, in fact, the Quran resonates this equality by eloquently repeating "men and women" with ethical and practical qualities throughout the verses, and even emphasizes this ten times in the following verse:
033:035 "Verily for all men and women who have surrendered themselves unto God, and all believing men and believing women, and all truly devout men and truly devout women, and all men and women who are true to their word, and all men and women who are patient in adversity, and all men and women who humble themselves before God, and all men and women who give in charity, and all self-denying men and self-denying women, and all men and women who are mindful of their chastity, and all men and women who remmber God unceasingly: for all of them has God readied forgiveness of sins and a mighty reward."
It is paramount to understand that the Quran equates being a "mu'min" (sing.) with actual practice, so that it is not enough to just have faith in principle; we must put our faith into practice. The same applies to our belief in the equality of men and women; gender equality as outlined in the Quran must also be put into practice. In reference to the above verse, modern scholar Laila Ahmed in "Women and Gender in Islam" says that "the implications are far-reaching. Ethical qualities, including those invoked here--charity, chastity, truthfulness, patience, piety--also have political and social dimensions."
Leila Ahmed
=======
An important and insightful academic study that needs to be read by everyone who cares about women, gender, feminism, Islam, the Middle East, or colonization. Lelia Ahmed is a superb scholar. She combines a traditional respect for the accuracy of the portrayal of the past with a sensitivity to modern theory about contested values and the political use of symbols. In this book, she provides a two-thousand-year survey of a vast region, consistently noting what still needs more research and the potential biases of her sources. She carefully traces differences of class and race within Islam and Middle Eastern societies. Historical context is absolutely critical in her account. Importantly, Ahmed is capable of recognizing contradictions and ambiguity that influence all our thinking.
Women and Gender challenges some basic assumptions about Islam and women. Ahmed clearly displays that Islam is not some sort of alien Other to western Christianity and culture. That view didn't emerge until the Crusades. Initially, both religions developed in a region connected by trade and armies. She notes the irony of "western civilization" claiming that it started in Babylon and Egypt.
Another misconception that Ahmed identifies is that Islam somehow emerged in isolation, pure and untouched by its neighbors. While Islamic leaders have always claimed authority to interpret their religion, in fact other interpretations and practices have always existed. She distinguishes between the ethical message of equality and the orthodox religious institution that established a legal hierarchy devaluing and attacking women. Muslim women, past and present, have cherished that equality at the core of their religion in a way that is difficult for non-Muslims to understand.
Both Christianity and Islam developed in a region where women were losing the respect and power they had known before the rise of nations. As their religious institutions grew, both added addition restrictions on women and both voiced real misogyny against them. The changing times can be seen in the contrast between Mohamed's first wife, a wealthy widow and merchant and his later wives and concubines who were secluded. After his death, his wives were able to continue to play important roles in the formalization of religious teaching, but soon such female power was lost. As the Muslim empire grow , it conquered neighboring countries taking many women as slaves and adapting other nations' traditions of concubinage and harems. Women lost public power and even the language changed, blurring lines between the words for woman, sexual partner, and slave. Despite internal challenges, the place of women within Islam changed little until European involvement in the region increased in the nineteenth century.
In her treatment of the colonialism of the past two centuries, Ahmed focuses her account on Egypt. In doing so, she hopes to make her topic manageable, and she sees Egypt as both a forerunner and representative of patterns which would occur throughout the Middle East. Her choice also allows her to quote the outrageous comments of the British colonizers and those who supported them. Englishman tried to justify their intention to destroy Islamic lifestyles by stating the need to save Muslim women from abuse by inferior Muslim men. In doing so they co-opted feminism and created problems that still exist today.
The colonizers' rhetoric about the problems of women was straight out of Victorian England, despite the fact that some British officials were working against suffrage in their homeland. In Egypt they did nothing about problematic laws relating to marriage, polygamy, and segregation of women, and they cut back on education for women and girls. Instead, they claimed that the most urgent need was to stop women's use of the veil. [Ahmed lays out their logic, but it is somewhat convoluted and impossible to summarize.]
In 1898, an Egyptian man, in total support of colonization and the elimination of Egyptian culture, wrote a book entitled, "The Liberation of Women." Although still sometimes identified as the first Egyptian feminist publication, it was in fact an attack on Muslim women as too dirty and too unattractive to attract their husbands' desire and too ignorant to raise adequate sons. Those who sought to expel the British and regain control of their country argued strongly against the book. In the process, the veil came to symbolize all that was good or bad about colonization.
After surveying the conflicting forces and beliefs among Egyptians down to the present, Ahmed discusses the conflicted nature of feminism within Egypt in the early twentieth century. She recounts the waves of women entering higher education and the professions in the 1960s and 1970s, linking their expanded lives to economic and political shifts. Then she discusses the rising popularity of Islam in more recent decades, particularly among young upwardly mobile college students and graduates. Rather than labeling them as regressive, she suggests various ways in which veiling can provide a sense of protection and community as they move into unfamiliar worlds of education and urban life. She worries, however, about lack of awareness of the real dangers of Islamic political leaders using religion to curtail their options as women as they have done in Iran.
In her conclusion, Ahmed urges westerners in general and feminists in particular to re-examine what their own positions mean to those who have experienced colonization. To them we are implicated alongside those who would force their countries into various types of submission. If we focus on the sexism of the men in their community or in their political and religious structures, we can only force women to choose between their ethnicity and their womanhood—much as African-American women have been forced to choose.
===================================
NOTE: Extracts, narration, paraphrases and replication from multiple sources. Please contact LMU if you require references.
#134
Discussions / suicide bombings
June 09, 2013, 06:13:51 AM #135
Discussions / holy nights
June 06, 2013, 06:14:52 AM
Salam,
Tonight is a special night for the "Turkish Islam" .
"Mosque festivals are called Kandil, which means Candle. It is so called because all the mosques are illuminated and those are the nights on which Muslims pray for forgiveness and wish to see the right way of things to be done according to their religion.
The story of Kandil
The five holy evenings on the Muslim calendar are called Kandil. During the Ottoman Empire Sultan Selim II of 16th century lit candles on the minarets of the mosques in order to announce these holy nights to the public. Since this calendar is calculated with the revolution of the moon around the earth the dates of the Kandils differ every year.
Mevlid Kandili - The birth of Prophet Mohammad (January 23, 2013)
Regaip Kandili – The night of Muhammed's conception (May 16, 2013)
Miraç Kandili – Prophet Mohammad's rising to sky (June 5, 2013)
Berat Kandili – The forgiveness of the sins (June 23, 2013)
Kadir Gecesi – The Koran's first appearance to Prophet Mohammad (August 3, 2013)
These nights Muslims usually worship and sing Mevlit, a poem written for the birth of Prophet Mohammad. "
I want to point out that this tradition is inherited from the Ottomans- the Sultans who used to be the khalifa of the Islamic ummah- which is fiercely being defended by the Erdogan government.
Tonight is a special night for the "Turkish Islam" .
"Mosque festivals are called Kandil, which means Candle. It is so called because all the mosques are illuminated and those are the nights on which Muslims pray for forgiveness and wish to see the right way of things to be done according to their religion.
The story of Kandil
The five holy evenings on the Muslim calendar are called Kandil. During the Ottoman Empire Sultan Selim II of 16th century lit candles on the minarets of the mosques in order to announce these holy nights to the public. Since this calendar is calculated with the revolution of the moon around the earth the dates of the Kandils differ every year.
Mevlid Kandili - The birth of Prophet Mohammad (January 23, 2013)
Regaip Kandili – The night of Muhammed's conception (May 16, 2013)
Miraç Kandili – Prophet Mohammad's rising to sky (June 5, 2013)
Berat Kandili – The forgiveness of the sins (June 23, 2013)
Kadir Gecesi – The Koran's first appearance to Prophet Mohammad (August 3, 2013)
These nights Muslims usually worship and sing Mevlit, a poem written for the birth of Prophet Mohammad. "
I want to point out that this tradition is inherited from the Ottomans- the Sultans who used to be the khalifa of the Islamic ummah- which is fiercely being defended by the Erdogan government.